Wind turbines operate at a wind farm in Burqin County, Altay Prefecture, Northwest China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, on July 25, 2026. Photo: VCG In economics, overcapacity is a dynamic and relative concept. Supply-demand balance is temporary, and imbalance is the norm. The Western narrative that equates the sheer scale of China's production capacity directly with "overcapacity" is, frankly, economically illiterate. It conflates size with pathology. Consider the math. China's manufacturing sector accounts for roughly 30 percent of global manufacturing value-added - a dominance unmatched since the post-war US. Yet this reflects not overcapacity but competitive capacity. The critics ignore that China's trade surplus in 2025 reached a record $1.2 trillion, roughly equivalent to the GDP of a top-20 economy like Saudi Arabia. They ignore that Chinese exports carry high import content - foreign value-added accounts for nearly half of gross export value - meaning China's capacity integrates global supply chains rather than displacing them. The judgment lacks rigor because it applies a static snapshot to a dynamic system. It assumes that if China produces more than it currently consumes domestically, the surplus is automatically "overcapacity." Nonsense. By that logic, Germany's persistent trade surplus in automobiles and machinery would constitute chronic overcapacity. It does not, because German capacity serves global demand. So does China's. The narrative isn't economics. It's politics dressed in economic jargon. Western critics attribute the price advantages of Chinese green technology products to "government subsidies" and "market distortion." This is a convenient story. It is also wrong. The global competitiveness of China's green technology industries stems from four interconnected factors: massive domestic market scale, decades of sustained infrastructure investment, a highly educated STEM workforce, and fierce intra-industry competition. China's NEV purchase-tax exemptions, extended through 2027, total approximately 520 billion yuan ($77.05 billion). Substantial? Yes. But causally linked to overcapacity? No. The causal chain critics imagine - subsidies → artificial competitiveness → overproduction - collapses under scrutiny. The EU's IPCEI battery programs allocated over 6 billion euros, plus EIB financing. The US CHIPS Act appropriated $54.2 billion for semiconductors, while the Inflation Reduction Act funnels hundreds of billions into clean energy. All major economies subsidize strategic industries. The difference is that China converted subsidies into systemic efficiency: its nominal lithium-ion cell capacity reached approximately 2.2 TWh by end-2023, driving global average battery pack prices down 20 percent year-on-year to $115 per kilowatt-hour in 2024. That is not distortion. That's innovation at scale. Chinese firms filed 20,081 European patent applications in 2024 - 10.1 percent of the total, with battery technology patents surging 79 percent year-on-year. Patents reflect innovation, not subsidy dependency. The causal link between subsidies and overcapacity is weak; the link between scale, innovation, and competitiveness is robust. Meanwhile, global demand for green and low-carbon transition is experiencing explosive growth. The International Energy Agency projects that renewable capacity additions must triple by 2030 to meet Paris Agreement targets. In this context, labeling China's wind, photovoltaic, and battery capacity as "overcapacity" is not merely wrong - it is dangerously counterproductive. In fact, China's capacity has played an indispensable role in advancing the global energy transition. Chinese solar module production costs have fallen roughly 90 percent over the past decade. Goldman Sachs Research notes that China manufactured approximately 86 percent of global solar modules, 80 percent of lithium-ion batteries, and 68 percent of electric vehicles in 2024. This is not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets; it is capacity the world desperately needs. The "overcapacity" label assumes a zero-sum game where Chinese production crowds out others. The reality is synergistic: Chinese capacity lowers global clean energy costs, enabling faster deployment worldwide. The "overcapacity" label holds only if one believes the world should slow decarbonization to protect less competitive producers and to empower those that deliberately employ "burn, baby, burn" tactics. That's industrial protectionism intersecting with brown imperialism, and it's disproportionately impacting the Global South, which is more vulnerable to climate breakdown, precisely when it's finally trying to shake off centuries of systemic Western exploitation and suppression. Furthermore, the disparity in how the West treats its own industrial policy versus China's is glaring. When the US funnels $52.7 billion through the CHIPS Act for semiconductors, or when the EU subsidizes Airbus, or when American agricultural subsidies distort global food markets, the silence from Western media is deafening. When China gains an edge in manufacturing, it faces media offensives and policy restrictions. This is not inconsistency. This is strategy. The underlying motivation is the "China threat" rubric - a framework that treats China's development itself as a danger to the Western-led order. Countries wagging their fingers at China do so not because China violates economic rules they themselves follow, but because China succeeds under rules they once wrote to their own advantage. These accusers possess their own national industrial policies and subsidies. They have long exploited historical and contemporary advantages against China and developing countries. They have not competed well, have not provided themselves with good governance, and have not invested adequately in their own infrastructure, education, and R&D. They have allowed their own leading industries to seek monopolistic positions detrimental not only to others but to their own consumers. Rather than reform themselves, they blame China. In these contexts, the cry of "China Shock 2.0" is the latest iteration of an old playbook: frame China's development as a threat to global stability rather than a contribution to global progress. The claim that China's advances in renewable energy and AI will send more serious shock waves than traditional manufacturing displacement is analytically flawed and politically motivated. First, the premise is false. China is not reducing the market share of developed countries through unfair means; it is outcompeting them through innovation, scale, and efficiency. According to Goldman Sachs Research, China's "new three" green technology sectors alone contributed around one percentage point to the country's 5.4 percent nominal export growth in 2025. This is competitive capacity serving global demand, not overcapacity dumped on foreign markets. Second, the "shock" framing ignores history. China maintained production and trade flows in 2020 while major Western economies crashed, providing essential goods to global markets, likely saving millions of lives while mitigating what would have been greater global economic harm. The "shock" is not to the global economy; it is to Western complacency. Third, the argument is self-contradictory. The critics want China to be simultaneously weak enough to dismiss and strong enough to fear. If China's high-tech development is genuinely formidable - so innovative and efficient that it threatens to displace developed economies - then it is delivering precisely the technological progress the world needs to meet climate goals. Restricting it through tariffs and barriers would harm global innovation, raise energy costs for developing countries, and slow decarbonization. The critics would be sacrificing the planet to protect their own complacency. "China Shock 2.0" is a rhetorical device to justify protectionism. It replaces engagement with containment, competition with confrontation. The world does not need another shock doctrine. It needs cooperation, investment, and the recognition that China's rise is not a threat but an opportunity - for green transition, for technological progress, for shared prosperity, and for a shared future. The author is a professor of politics and international relations and director of the Center for Ecological Civilization at East China Normal University in Shanghai. [email protected] 。
北京时间8月22日晚，2026-27赛季英超首轮，曼联客场0比2不敌升班马赫尔城。
B | 一支刚花了一个夏天补强、上赛季末段在卡里克带领下势头不错的球队，在MKM球场被一支时隔九年重返英超的“老虎”按在地上摩擦。
C | 更扎心的是数据：曼联控球率72%、射门21比8、角球6比1，结果却是零封落败，且两个丢球全部来自定位球。这是曼联顶级联赛历史上首次在赛季首战输给升班马，上一次在联赛里输给赫尔城还要追溯到1974年的英乙——算下来正好52年。
D | 一、定位球防守，还是老毛病两个丢球如出一辙：第17分钟，斯莱特开出左侧角球，麦克伯尼后点铲射被门将拉门斯扑出，阿贾伊补射空门；第38分钟，又是斯莱特主罚任意球传中，中卫诺贝尔·门迪力压防守头球破门。
E | 两粒进球，全都来自定位球，而且进球的都是赫尔城的中后卫。这不是偶然。
F | 队长B费赛后罕见地直白：“和上次赛季一样的错误，每个客场我们都把太多球权让给对方。我们知道赛前定位球会是他们的大杀器，他们整个季前赛打四后卫，唯独对我们上了五后卫，就为这些高空球。”换句话说，曼联防定位球的过程问题，赛前就被点名，结果还是一防一个准。中卫防空、二点保护、禁区弧顶的盯人，老问题一个没解决。
G | 二、身体对抗和比赛强度，被全面压制控球率72%是个陷阱。
H | 阿兰·希勒赛后毫不留情：“曼联球员场上毫无求胜欲望，体能状态极差。”他的搭档麦考伊斯特也认同：全场只有赫尔城一支球队体能在线。赫尔城全队身价、名气远不如曼联，但他们的五后卫体系组织严密，麦克伯尼在中路持续制造威胁，每一次由守转攻都带着冲劲。反观曼联，拿球之后节奏偏慢，出球犹豫，被对手的高位逼抢一逼就乱。卡里克上赛季末段带队打出过不错的反弹，靠的就是跑动和强度。但这场，球员明显没进入“高强度对抗90分钟”的状态。B费自己也承认：“我们需要更激进地逼抢。”一个字——累，或者说，准备不足。
I | 三、进攻端“得势不得分”，打法被看穿曼联全场39次传中，头球射正却是0次。这个数字几乎浓缩了整场进攻的尴尬：一味起高球往禁区里砸，但禁区里既没有高点支点，传中质量也偏低，赫尔城两名中卫轮流把球顶出去。拉什福德第46分钟替补登场，身披久违的9号，这是他618天来首次为曼联出战正式比赛——可他的回归没能带来质变，几次机会都没转化为威胁。苏格兰名宿麦考伊斯特的点评一针见血：曼联的进攻套路太容易被预判。库尼亚、姆伯莫、B费都在个人能力上有货，但一旦被对手用密集防线锁死空间，球队缺乏变招，缺乏在禁区前沿用一脚直塞或远射撕开防线的“火花”。
J | 下半场曼联围攻，却只有姆伯莫打出过一次被门将化解的单刀——这就是红魔本场进攻的全部成色。
K | 四、阵容磨合与建队逻辑，存疑卡里克本场给了蒂勒曼斯和安德雷·桑托斯两名新援中场首秀，结果两人第67分钟就一同被换下，首秀谈不上成功。曼联整个夏窗在进攻端和中场砸了钱，但后防始终是那块最短的木板。天空体育评论区几乎一边倒地呼吁“赶紧买正经中卫”，球迷点名要引进昆萨（Quansah）级别的后卫。与此同时，与布莱顿就巴莱巴7000万英镑的转会已达成协议，下周转正——可防线若不变，买再多中场也填不上定位球和防空的大坑。必须说，一轮联赛定不了生死。卡里克赛后保持了冷静：“结果令人失望，但不会动摇我们的方向。”赫尔城本场确实配得上胜利——他们的教练雅基罗维奇把战术执行到了极致，升班马的气焰写在脸上。但对曼联而言，这场0比2是一记响亮的耳光。
L | 52年不遇的纪录、首次首轮不敌升班马、B费亲口承认的“同样错误”——这些标签叠加在一起，说明问题不在运气，而在底盘。接下来一周，曼联要在老特拉福德迎来另一支升班马伊普斯维奇，如果连定位球和体能这两道坎都过不去，球迷的耐心会比积分榜掉得更快。卡里克的“蜜月期”，可能比想象中短得多。（罗掌柜）
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